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This article presents a probabilistic logic L whose sentences can be interpreted
as asserting the acceptability of gambles. The logic L has a concrete syntax and a
complete inference procedure, and it handles conditional as well as unconditional
probabilities. It synthesizes the probabilistic logic of Nilsson [10] and the anytime infer-
ence procedure of Frisch and Haddawy [4] with the logic of gambles of Wilson and
Moral [17].
Nilsson and Frisch and Haddawy build their probabilistic logics, which we designate by
LN and LFH, respectively, on top of an underlying logic. According to their semantics,
which we call the measure–theoretic semantics for probabilistic logic, each sentence says
something about the probability of a sentence in the underlying logic. Our probabilistic
logic, which we designate by L, also has an underlying logic, and can use measure–theo-
retic semantics. When it does use this semantics, it is a strict generalization of Nilsson’s
and Frisch and Haddawy’s logics: a sentence in LN or LFH translates into L with no
change in meaning. However,L also contains more complex sentences. Instead of merely
saying something about the probability of an individual sentence of the underlying logic, a
sentence in L may say something about the expected value of a gamble whose payoﬀ
depends on the truth values of several sentences in the underlying logic.
Moreover, whereas Nilsson only discusses how to reason with models, and Frisch and
Haddawy do not demonstrate completeness for their set of inference rules, we give a com-
plete set of inference rules forL. In generalizing from probabilities to expected values, we
are following Wilson and Moral, and our demonstration of the completeness of our logic
uses the same strategy as a demonstration of the completeness of their logic, which we des-
ignate byLWM. We go well beyond their results, however, because we handle conditional
as well as unconditional probabilities and we insist on a concrete syntax.
Fagin, Halpern and Meggido [3], have formulated probabilistic logics that use
measure–theoretic semantics, and have complete inference procedures; we designate
them by LFHM. They consider only the case where the underlying logic is propositional
logic, but in this case, their probabilistic logics are more expressive than ours. In the
case where our probabilistic logic L uses measure–theoretic semantics and uses proposi-
tional logic as its underlying logic, it can be regarded as a relatively small fragment of
one of Fagin, Halpern, and Meggido’s logics, but it is still of some interest, because it
enables complete inference about relatively elementary probability statements (including
those considered by Nilsson and by Frisch and Haddawy) without the greater complexity
of Fagin, Halpern, and Meggido’s logics. In [6], Halpern and Pucella consider upper
probability measures, and in [7] they add reasoning about expectation. There is a large
body of other important related work on probabilistic logic that is not directly used
in our paper ([2,5] include reviews of this literature). Recently, for example, Biazzo
et al. [1] have described an approach to probabilistic logic based on betting schemes,
and Lukasiewicz [8] has extended this approach to related nonmonotonic probabilistic
logics.
What we ﬁnd most interesting about L is an alternative semantics that suggests paths
for generalization diﬀerent from the paths followed by other authors. This alternative
semantics, which we call behavioral semantics, hews more closely to the notion of accept-
ability and can be formalized using the concept of lower prevision developed by Walley
[15]. In measure–theoretic semantics, an interpretation for a probabilistic logic is a prob-
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this probability distribution gives the gamble nonnegative expected value. But this implies
that if a gamble is not acceptable, then the opposite gamble (the gamble with the signs of
all the payoﬀs reversed) is acceptable. No such implication is inherent in the notion of a
gamble being acceptable, and no such implication is built into our probabilistic logic
(the syntax considered in this article does not even provide for negation of acceptability
statements). Behavioral semantics avoids these implications and therefore can be extended
to martingale trees [11] and probability games [14]; see [13].1.1. Comparative summary
Table 1 summarizes how our logic compares with others. As the table indicates, our
approach is a synthesis of Nilsson’s, Frisch and Haddawy’s and Wilson and Moral’s, com-
bining the best features of their approaches. We also show for comparison Fagin, Halpern
and Meggiddo’s more expressive logics.
When we say that Nilsson’s system does not have an anytime inference procedure, we
mean that the linear program must be run to completion. In contrast our language, like
that of Frisch and Haddawy, is modular, and interim inferences are valid even though they
may not have computed the tightest possible bounds at the time computation is stopped.
Another advantage of modularity is elaboration tolerance: additional premises can be
introduced and additional questions can be asked without discarding or repeating work
already done. Our language, like Frisch and Haddawy’s, is elaboration tolerant in this
sense. Notice, however, that we have labeled Wilson and Moral’s language as elaboration
intolerant, even though it seems to have an anytime inference procedure. This is because
its inference procedure takes for granted that the sample space has already been set up.
When we introduce a new sentence, whether as a premise or a goal, old possibilities
may split, according to whether the new sentence is true or false. So no system that takes
the sample space for granted is elaboration tolerant.
Our assertion that Wilson and Moral do not have a concrete syntax refers to the fact
that they do not specify any particular symbolic representation for their gambles. They
specify syntax neither for their probabilistic logic nor for an underlying logicL0. Nilsson,
in contrast, does insist on a concrete syntax for the underlying logicL0, although he does
not specify a syntax for his probabilistic logic.
When we say that Wilson and Moral do not handle conditional probabilities, we mean
only that they do not do so explicitly. A bound on a conditional probability can easily
be re-expressed as a statement of the type they do handle. When we say that our logicTable 1
Comparison of related work
LN LFH LWM LFHM L
Complete inference procedure Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Anytime inference procedure No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Elaboration tolerant No Yes No Yes Yes
Concrete syntax No Yes No Yes Yes
Handles conditional probabilities No Yes No Yes Yes
Hyperplane expressive No No Yes Yes Yes
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that these logics can express an arbitrary linear constraint on a vector of probabilities
P, which requires P to lie on one side of a hyperplane. Such linear constraints can
be much more general than bounds on individual probabilities and conditional
probabilities.
Each of these three logics can be seen as a simpliﬁcation of the logicL developed in this
article. L is not, however, the most expressive probabilistic logic possible. It can bound
the vector of probabilities P by hyperplanes, and hence it can express the statement that
P is in a given simplex, but it cannot express more complicated restrictions on P. For
example, it cannot express statements about the probability p of a single sentence in the
underlying logic such as ‘‘0.3 6 p 6 0.5 or 0.5 6 p 6 0.7’’. Probabilistic logics that can
express such statements include those of Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo [3], which make
use of rich inferential machinery including all instances of propositional tautologies,
modus ponens, all instances of valid formulae about linear inequalities, and four axioms
for probability. Semantically, the absence of Boolean combinations of sentences in our
logic is signiﬁcant; in particular, sentences in our logic assert the (conditional) acceptabil-
ity of gambles—our logic is not designed to express the assertion that a gamble is (condi-
tionally) unacceptable. Finally, Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo’s logics follow an axiomatic
approach, with modus ponens as the single inference rule; in contrast, our logic follows a
natural deduction approach with a single axiom and a number of inference rules. In our
view, this approach is intuitively simpler.2. Syntax and inference for L
We designate our probabilistic logic by L. In this section, we describeL’s syntax and
inference procedure. This description involves some informal explanation of L’s seman-
tics. In the next two sections, we formalize the semantics in two diﬀerent ways and dem-
onstrate the soundness and completeness of the inference procedure with respect to both
formalizations.
The sentences of L have the form
hða1; a1Þ    ðan; anÞ j di; ð1Þ
where n is a nonnegative integer, a1, . . . ,an and d are sentences of an underlying logicL0,
and a1, . . . ,an are real numbers. The list (a1,a1)    (an,an) represents a gamble, which pays
the sum of those ai for which the corresponding sentence ai turns out to be true. Sentence
(1) means that this gamble is acceptable to an agent when his knowledge relative to the
sentences in L0 consists of knowledge that d is true. In the next two sections, we make
this idea into a formal semantics in two diﬀerent ways. In Section 3, we formalize it as
the condition that the payoﬀ of the gamble has nonnegative expected value conditional
on d; because the expected value has to be computed relative to some probability distribu-
tion, this constitutes a use of what we have already called measure–theoretic semantics for
probabilistic logic. In Section 4, we formalize it in terms of our behavioral semantics, in
which probability distributions are replaced by lower previsions.
If the sentence d inL0 is a tautology, then the sentence (1) inL means that the gamble
(a1,a1)    (an,an) is acceptable a priori. This is the special case of unconditional acceptabil-
ity considered by Wilson and Moral. But even here we diﬀer from Wilson and Moral by
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functions on a sample space.2.1. The underlying logic L0
We assume that the underlying logicL0 has propositional symbols p, p
0, p00, etc., is two-
valued with values in {true, false}, and uses the symbols :, ^, _, ?, and > in the usual
way. In particular, (a) the set of sentences includes each of the propositional symbols,
?, and >, and is closed under :, ^ and _; and (b) an interpretation x satisﬁes :a if
and only if it does not satisfy a, satisﬁes a ^ b if and only if it satisﬁes both a and b, sat-
isﬁes a _ b if and only if it satisﬁes at least one of a or b, never satisﬁes ? and always
satisﬁes >. We use )0 and ()0, respectively, for derivability and logical equivalence:
a1)0 a2 means that a2 can be derived from a1 (i.e., a1‘L0 a2), and a1 ()0 a2 means that
either can be derived from the other (i.e., a1‘L0 a2 and a2‘L0 a1).
We assume that L0 has a sound and complete inference procedure, so that a1 ()0 a2
holds whenever the two are semantically equivalent. We assume that L0’s inference pro-
cedure is complete only because we need this assumption in order to show completeness
forL. It is not needed in order forL’s inference procedure to be well-deﬁned and sound.
We make no further assumptions aboutL0, but reasoning withinL0 is part of reason-
ing within L and so details about L0 are relevant to implementation. Unlike Fagin,
Halpern, and Megiddo’s logics, however, propositional reasoning takes place only within
L0.
Let us write wﬀ0 for the set consisting of all sentences ofL0. Given a truth assignment
M forL0, let us designate by xM the interpretation it determines—this is a mapping from
wﬀ0 to {true, false}. And let us write X0 for the set consisting of all such interpretations
X0 :¼ fxM j M is a truth assignment for L0g:
We call X0 the sample space forL0. This concept should be contrasted with the notion of
the sample space for a ﬁnite set of sentences in L0, used in Nilsson’s work. Whereas we
might explicitly construct the sample space for a few hundred sentences, there is no rea-
sonable sense in which we can explicitly construct X0. If L0 is undecidable, explicit con-
struction of X0 is not even theoretically possible. But as a theoretical (rather than a
computational) object, X0 will be very useful in our mathematical reasoning about L.
We call any real-valued function on X0 a variable, and denote by X the set of all vari-
ables. Given a variable X 2 X and a subset A  X0, we deﬁne a variable XA by
XAðxÞ :¼ X ðxÞ if x 2 A;
0 otherwise:

ð2Þ
We call XA the restriction of X to A. We can write XA = X Æ IA, where the dot denotes
pointwise multiplication and IA is A’s indicator variable
IAðxÞ :¼
1 if x 2 A;
0 otherwise:

ð3Þ
Clearly ðX 1 þ X 2ÞA ¼ XA1 þ XA2 , (rX)A = rXA, and (XA)B = XA\B.
Given a 2 wﬀ0, let [a] be the subset of X0 consisting of those truth assignments that
assign a the value true: [a] :¼ {x 2 X0 jx(a) = true}. Then the set A0 :¼ f½a j a 2 wff0g
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We call a ﬁnitely additive probability measure on the ﬁeld A0 a probability distribution
on X0.
2.2. Gambles in L0
We call an ordered pair (a,a), where a 2 wﬀ0 and a is a real number, a ticket. We call a
list (a1,a1)    (an,an), where n is a nonnegative integer and the (ai,ai) are tickets, a gamble.
The ai are the sentences of the gamble; the ai are the payoﬀs. The integer n may be zero; in
this case the gamble is an empty list. Notice also that a ticket may occur in a gamble more
than once. We write Gamble for the set consisting of all gambles. We use meta-variables
such as G, G 0, etc. to designate gambles without specifying their tickets.
Given a gamble G = (a1,a1)    (an,an), we deﬁne a variable XG by
XGðxÞ :¼
X
fai j 1 6 i 6 n and xðaiÞ ¼ trueg ¼
Xn
i¼1
ai  I ½aiðxÞ: ð4Þ
We call XG the variable representation for the gamble G. Many diﬀerent gambles can be
represented by the same variable. We call a variable X simple if X = XG for some gamble
G. A variable is simple if and only if (1) it takes only a ﬁnite number of values, and (2) for
each real number r, there exists a 2 wﬀ0 such that {x jX(x) = r} = [a] (in the language of
probability theory, X is measurable with respect to A0).
Here is our notation for manipulating gambles:
• Given a gamble G = (a1,a1)    (an,an) and a sentence b inL0, we write Gb for the result
of conjoining each ai with b
Gb :¼ ða1 ^ b; a1Þ    ðan ^ b; anÞ:
• Given a gamble G = (a1,a1)    (an,an) and a real number r, we write rG for the result of
multiplying each ai by r
rG :¼ ða1; ra1Þ    ðan; ranÞ:
• Given gambles G = (a1,a1)    (an,an) and G 0 = (b1,b1)    (bm,bm), we write GG 0 for the
result of concatenating G and G 0
GG0 :¼ ða1; a1Þ    ðan; anÞðb1; b1Þ    ðbm; bmÞ:
These manipulations aﬀect the variable representation in obvious and straightforward
ways: XGb ¼ X ½bG (see Eq. (2)), XrG = rXG, and XGG0 ¼ XG þ XG0 .
We sometimes want to append a ticket to a gamble or remove an instance of a ticket
from a gamble:
• Appending a ticket to a gamble means adding it at the end, without regard to whether
it already occurs in the gamble. For example, the result of appending (b,b) to
(a,a)(b,b)(c,c) is (a,a)(b,b)(c,c)(b,b).
• Removing an instance of (b,b) from (a,a)(b,b)(c,c)(b,b) can result in either (a,a)
(b,b)(c,c) or (a,a)(c,c)(b,b).
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1 Append (a, 0)
2 Remove an instance of (a, 0)
3 Append (?,a)
4 Remove an instance of (?,a)
5 Remove an instance of (a,a), and append (a,a1) and (a,a2), where a1 + a2 = a
6 Remove an instance of (a,a1) and an instance of (a,a2), and append (a,a1 + a2)
7 Remove an instance of (a,a), and append (b,a) and (c,a), where b ^ c ()0 ? and
b _ c ()0 a
8 Remove an instance of (b,a) and an instance of (c,a), and append (a,a), where
b ^ c ()0 ? and b _ c ()0 a
9 Remove an instance of (a,a) and append (b,a), where b ()0 aWe say that two gambles G and G 0 equivalent if we can get from one to the other by
elementary moves—i.e., if there is a ﬁnite sequence of gambles G1, . . . ,Gk such that
G1 = G, Gk = G
0, and Gi+1 can be obtained from Gi by an elementary move, for
i = 1, . . . ,k  1. This is evidently an equivalence relation. Elementary moves in part are
similar to Fagin, Halpern, and Meggido’s valid formulae about linear equalities and in
part capture intuitions regarding the decomposition of gambles and the nature of
probability.
Proposition 2.1. Gambles G and G 0 are equivalent if and only if XG ¼ XG0 .
It is easy to see that XG ¼ XG0 when G 0 is obtained from G by an elementary move, and
this implies that XG ¼ XG0 whenever G and G 0 are equivalent. So our task is to show that
XG ¼ XG0 implies the equivalence of G and G 0.
To do so, we introduce some additional concepts. We say that two ofL0’s sentences a
and b are disjoint if a ^ b ()0 ? and that a gamble (a1,a1)    (an,an) is in standard form if
the following conditions are satisﬁed:
• The sentences are disjoint: ai ^ aj ()0 ? for i5 j.
• No sentence is absurd: ai,– 0 ? for all i.
• No payoﬀ is zero: ai5 0 for all i.
• The payoﬀs are distinct and in increasing order: a1 <    < an.Lemma 2.2. Any gamble is equivalent to a gamble in standard form.Proof. Consider a gamble G = (a1,a1)    (an,an). By repeated elementary moves of type 7,
we can reduce G to an equivalent gamble G1 in which every ticket’s sentence has the form
b1 ^    ^ bn; ð5Þ
where for each i, either bi = ai or else bi ¼ :ai. (We ignore the placement of parentheses in
the expression (5), but we assume that these parentheses are placed in some canonical way,
using if necessary elementary moves of type 9.) Any two sentences in G1 are either disjoint
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equivalent sentences, reducing G1 to an equivalent gamble G2 whose sentences are disjoint.
Using repeated elementary moves of type 8, we can reduce G2 to an equivalent gamble G3
whose sentences are still disjoint and whose payoffs are all distinct. Elementary moves of
types 0, 2, and 4 will then reduce G3 to an equivalent gamble in standard form. hLemma 2.3. If G and G 0 are in standard form, and XG ¼ XG0 , then G and G 0 are equivalent.Proof. As XG ¼ XG0 , the two gambles must have the same list of payoﬀs a1, . . . ,an. Since G
and G 0 are in standard form, G = (a1,a1)    (an,an) and G 0 = (b1,a1)    (bn,an), where
[ai] = [bi] for i = 1, . . . ,n. So ai ()0 bi, and G can be transformed into G 0 by elementary
moves of type 9. h
We complete the proof of Proposition 2.1 by considering two gambles G1 and G2 such
that XG1 ¼ XG2 and showing that they are equivalent. By Lemma 2.2, we have gambles G01
and G02 that are in standard form and are equivalent to G1 and G2 respectively. The equiv-
alence of G0i and Gi implies that XG0i ¼ XGi , and hence that XG01 ¼ XG02 . By Lemma 2.3, G
0
1
and G02 are equivalent. Hence G1 and G2 are equivalent.2.3. The syntax of L
A sentence of L is any expression of the form (1), where n is a nonnegative integer, d
and a, . . . ,an are sentences ofL0, and a1, . . . ,an are real numbers. Notice that n is allowed
to be zero, so that h j di is a sentence of L.
We write wﬀ for the set consisting of all sentences of L. For a sentence h(a1,a1)   
(an,an) j di in wﬀ we call (a1,a1)    (an,an) its gamble, and d its condition. We use meta-vari-
ables such as S, S 0, etc. to designate elements of wﬀ without specifying their gambles or
conditions.
We do not form negations of the sentences inL: when S is a sentence ofL, :S is not a
sentence in L. Nor do we form conjunctions or disjunctions.
2.4. Inference in L
We now deﬁne an inference relation ‘ for L.
We adopt one axiom schema and ﬁve inference rules. The axiom schema applies to any
a,d 2 wﬀ0 while the inference rules apply to any G,G 0 2 Gamble, and any d,  2 wﬀ0.
Acceptability
RATIONALITY ‘ h(a, 1) j di.
SUBSTITUTION hG j di ‘ hG 0 j di if G and G 0 are equivalent.
COMBINATION {hG j di, hG 0 j di} ‘ hGG 0 j di.
SCALING hG j di ‘ hrG j di if rP 0.
Conditioning
CONTINGENCY hG j di ‘ hGd j i if d)0 .
UPDATING hGd j i ‘ hG j di if d)0 .
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gambles, consistent with Wilson and Moral’s approach or Walley’s sense of desirability
as applied to our formal notion of gambles. Thus, a gamble in which we can only win
is always acceptable; an acceptable gamble is acceptable no matter how it is written; the
combination of acceptable gambles is acceptable, and a multiple or fraction of an accept-
able gamble is itself acceptable. The conditioning rules, on the other hand, are exactly
what is needed to capture a particular interpretation of conditional probabilities (the
‘‘called-oﬀ bet’’ interpretation implicit in Frisch and Haddawy’s system). Under this inter-
pretation, conditional probabilities can be deﬁned in terms of unconditional probabilities,
and so our logic could be formulated more simply without using conditioning sentences.
Whether the conditioning rules appear trivial or deep depends, of course, on one’s intu-
itions regarding the nature of conditional probabilities. Our intention in future work, how-
ever, is to study variants of our logic L in which the acceptability axiom and rules are
retained in conjunction with weaker conditioning rules, and conditioning sentences then
remain fundamental. In particular, we are interested in studying weaker forms of
UPDATING.
Inference proceeds in the usual way. One starts with a set of premises and enlarges it in
steps, including at each either an axiom or a sentence whose inference is authorized from
sentences already in the set by one of the inference rules. If C  wﬀ, S 2 wﬀ, and we can
infer S from C, then we write C ‘ S.
Implementing the inference rules involves, of course, using the inference procedure of
the underlying logic L0. In order to use CONTINGENCY, for example, we must show that
 can be inferred from d. Inference in L0 enters even into the use of SUBSTITUTION, since
we need to demonstrate equivalence or implication inL0 in order to prove the equivalence
of two gambles.
The following proposition lists some elementary consequences of our inference
rules.
Proposition 2.4
(1) hG j di ‘ hGd j di and hGd j di ‘ hG j di.
(2) hG j di ‘ hGd j>i and hGd j>i ‘ hG j di.
(3) If d ()0 , then hG j d i ‘ hG j i.Proof. We obtain the two inferences in Statement 1 by setting  equal to d in CONTINGENCY
and UPDATING, respectively. We similarly obtain Statement 2 by setting  equal to >. To
derive Statement 3, we start with hG j di, use CONTINGENCY to get hGd j i, use the equiva-
lence of the gambles Gd and G, together with SUBSTITUTION, to get hG j i, and then use
UPDATING to get hG j i. h
It is noteworthy that the logic L includes an absurdity—a sentence from which any
other sentence can be inferred. This is the sentence h(>, 1) j>i. This sentence says that
our agent is willing to give away $1 a priori, and the inference rules allow us to infer from
this that he will be willing to give away any amount of money under any other state of
knowledge d. If C ‘ h(>, 1) j>i, then we say that C is incoherent. More generally, if
C ‘ h(d, 1) j di, then we say that C is incoherent in d.
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As we have already explained informally, we can adapt the measure–theoretic semantics
for our language L by using the notion of conditional expected value:
• An interpretation of L is a probability distribution P on the sample space X0.
• An interpretation P satisﬁes a sentence hG j di if P’s expected value for the variable XG
(see Eq. (4)), conditional on d, is nonnegative.
This deﬁnition of satisfaction is only informal. Our formal deﬁnition will resolve the
indeterminacy of conditional expected value when the condition d has probability zero
in a way consistent with Frisch and Haddawy: the sentence is satisﬁed by the interpreta-
tion in this case.
In this section, we study the entailment relation forL based on this measure–theoretic
semantics and then show that the inference procedure we described in the preceding sec-
tion is sound and complete with respect to this relation. We explain our alternative seman-
tics, behavioral semantics in the next section.3.1. Entailment under measure–theoretic semantics
Formally, we say that P satisﬁes h(a1,a1)    (an,an) j di if
Xn
i¼1
ai  P ð½ai \ ½dÞP 0: ð6Þ
This inequality is equivalent to
Xn
i¼1
ai  P ð½ai \ ½dÞP ð½dÞ P 0 ð7Þ
provided that we agree to the convention that the ratio P([ai] \ [d])/P([d]) is equal to
zero (and hence inequality (7) is satisﬁed) whenever the denominator, P([d]), is equal
to zero. The left-hand side of inequality (7) is the conditional expected value of the
variable corresponding to the gamble (a1,a1)    (an,an), conditional on the event [d].
This justiﬁes the informal deﬁnition we oﬀered a moment ago: P satisﬁes hG j di if the
expected value of XG, conditional on d, is nonnegative. This treatment of conditional
probability is mandated by the called-oﬀ bet interpretation of conditional probability dis-
cussed earlier.
If we write G for the gamble (a1,a1)    (an,an), then we can rewrite the inequality (6) as
a condition on the variable representation for G
EPX
½d
G P 0; ð8Þ
where EP represents the expected value operator for P.
We write m for the measure–theoretic entailment relation forL : Cm S if and only if
P satisﬁes S whenever P satisﬁes S 0 for all S 0 2 C. As usual, we abbreviate C m S to mS
when C is empty; this means that every interpretation P satisﬁes S.
P.R. Gillett et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 44 (2007) 281–300 2913.2. Soundness under measure–theoretic semantics
Now we verify thatL’s inference procedure is sound with respect to measure–theoretic
semantics: if C ‘ G, then C m G. It suﬃces to show that the axioms and the inference
rules are sound.
RATIONALITY ‘ h(a, 1) j di.
Every interpretation P satisﬁes h(a, 1) j di, because inequality (6) reduces to
P([a] \ [d])P 0 for this sentence, and a probability is always nonnegative.
SUBSTITUTION hG j di ‘ hG 0 j di if G and G 0 are equivalent.
Soundness follows from the fact that inequality (6) can be put in the form (8) and the
fact that equivalent gambles have the same variable representation (Proposition 2.1).
COMBINATION {hG j di, hG 0 j di} ‘ hGG 0 j di.
Soundness follows from inequality (8) and the relation X ½dGG0 ¼ X ½dG þ X ½dG0 .
SCALING hG j di ‘ hrG j di if rP 0.
Soundness follows from inequality (8) and the relation X ½drG ¼ rX ½dG .
CONTINGENCY hG j di ‘ hGd j i if d)0 .
Here we use inequality (8) and the calculation X ½
Gd
¼ ðX ½G Þ½d ¼ X ½\½dG ; when d)0 ,
[] \ [d] = [d].
UPDATING hGd j i ‘ hG j di if d)0 .
Soundness follows by the same argument as for CONTINGENCY.3.3. Completeness under measure–theoretic semantics
We ﬁrst establish several results that we use later in our demonstration:
Lemma 3.1. If X ½dG ¼ X ½d
0 
G0 , then hG j di ‘ hG 0 j d 0i.Proof. We have hG j di ‘ hGd j d _ d 0i by CONTINGENCY. Our hypothesis X ½dG ¼ X ½d
0 
G0 implies
XGd ¼ XG0d0 . So by Proposition 2.1, Gd and G0d
0
are equivalent, and therefore hGdj d _ d0i ‘
hG0d0 j d _ d0i by SUBSTITUTION. Finally, hG0d0 j d _ d0i ‘ hG0 j d0i by UPDATING. hLemma 3.2. If r > 0 and X ½d
0 
G0 ¼ rX ½dG , then hG j di ‘ hG
0 j d 0i.Proof. We have hG j di ‘ hrG j di by SCALING. And because our hypothesis can be written in
the form X ½d
0 
G0 ¼ X ½drG, we have hrG j di ‘ hG 0 j d 0i by Lemma 3.1. hLemma 3.3. If X ½dG ¼ X ½d1G1 þ X
½d2
G2
, then {hG1 j d1i, hG2 j d2i} ‘ hG j di.Proof. Because X ½di Gi ¼ XGdii ¼ X
½d1_d2
G
di
i
ði¼ 1;2Þ, we can infer hGd11 j d1 _ d2i and hGd22 j d1_d2i
by Lemma 3.1. We can then infer hGd11 Gd22 jd1 _ d2i by COMBINATION. Because
X ½d1_d2
G
d1
1
G
d1
1
¼ X ½d1_d2
G
d1
1
þX ½d1_d2
G
d2
2
¼ X ½d1G1 þX
½d2
G2
¼ X ½dG , we can then infer hG j di by Lemma 3.1. h
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sketch the outline of a proof thatL’s inference procedure is complete under our measure–
theoretic semantics: if C is ﬁnite and C m S, then C ‘ S.
It is convenient to consider the variable representation of gambles, and to rely on
the fact that our gambles are ﬁnite: each contains only a ﬁnite number of tickets. A ﬁnite
C therefore involves only a ﬁnite set of sentences in wﬀ0 that use only a ﬁnite set of
propositional symbols fpigki¼1. We write wﬀ* for the set of sentences generated by
fpigki¼1. Given a truth assignment M* for fpigki¼1, we designate by xM the interpreta-
tion it determines—a mapping from wﬀ* to {true, false}. We write X :¼
fxM j M is a truth assignment for fpigki¼1g and A :¼ f½a j a 2 wffg. Clearly, there
are only a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent interpretations determined in this way; i.e., X* and
A are ﬁnite. For each x 2 X0 there is a x* 2 X* that agrees with x for each member
of wﬀ*, and vice versa. For each ﬁnitely additive probability measure P on A0 there is
a ﬁnitely additive probability measure P* onA that agrees with it onA, and vice versa.
Each P* is deﬁned by its values on the individual x 2 X*. Note that for any S 2 C, P
satisﬁes S if and only if P* satisﬁes S. Hence, the P* form a new set of restricted models
for L.
A sentence hG j di 2 C has the variable representation X ½dG , a real-valued function on X0.
For each such variable X ½dG we can identify a variable X
½d
G which is a real-valued function
on X* such that X
½d
G ðxÞ ¼ X ½dGðxÞ. We write S* for the variable on X* generated in this
way by a sentence S 2 C when its gamble and condition are unspeciﬁed. Though we
proved them in their more general form, Lemmas 3.1–3.3 apply also to the restricted vari-
ables on X*.
We write I for the set of indicator variables I :¼ fIfwg j w 2 Xg. For each x 2 X*
there is a sentence ax 2 wﬀ* such that the indicator variable on X Ifxg ¼ XGx ¼ X ½>Gx ,
where Gx :¼ (ax, 1); by RATIONALITY, ‘h(ax, 1) j>i.
The set of variables on X* forms a linear space, which we denote by X. A subset of X
that is closed under addition and multiplication by nonnegative scalars is called a convex
cone. Given C  X, we write C(C) for the smallest convex cone containing C
CðCÞ :¼ fr1X 1 þ    þ rnX n j nP 1; 0 6 ri 2 R; X i 2 Cg:
We call a convex cone D ﬁnite if D = C(C) for a ﬁnite C. We deﬁne the inner product of
two variables X and Y by XY :¼Px2XX ðxÞY ðxÞ, and we deﬁne the dual cone C+ of a
subset C  X by
Cþ :¼ fX 2 X jXY P 0 for all Y 2 Cg:
We make use of a number of properties of ﬁnite cones (see [9]).
Theorem 3.4 (Reﬂexivity of ﬁnite convex cones). If D is a finite convex cone, then it is
reflexive; i.e. (D+)+ = D.
This theorem follows from a number of fundamental results on ﬁnite cones and dual
cones [9]. We also use the following property of dual cones:
Theorem 3.5. For any C1  X and C2  X, if C1  C2 then Cþ1  Cþ2 .
In order to apply these results to establish the ﬁnite completeness of our logic L, we
ﬁrst deﬁne, for a set of sentences C:
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the set of syntactic consequences of C, Con‘ :¼ fX ½dG j C ‘ hG j dig;
the set of semantic consequences of C, Con :¼ fX ½dG j CmhG j dig; and
the set of nonnegative functions, R :¼ fR 2L jRðxÞP 0 for all x 2 Xg.Proposition 3.6. For a finite set of sentences C:
(1) ConðCÞ ¼ ðCþ \RÞþ,
(2) Cþ \R ¼ Con‘ðCÞþ \R,
(3) Con‘ðCÞ ¼ CðC [IÞ,
(4) ðCðC [IÞÞþ \R ¼ ðCðC [IÞÞþ,
(5) Con(C) = (Con‘(C)
+)+,
(6) Con(C) = Con‘(C).Proof
(1) ConðCÞ ¼ ðCþ \RÞþ
ConðCÞ ¼ fX ½dG j P satisfies hG j di whenever P satisfies Y for every Y 2 Cg
¼ fX ½dG j P  satisfies hG j di whenever P  satisfies Y for every Y 2 Cg
¼ fX 2 X j TX P 0 for every T 2 R such that TY P 0 for every Y 2 Cg
¼ ðCþ \RÞþ; by the definition of dual cones:
þ þ(2) C \R ¼ Con‘ðCÞ \R
Cþ \R  fT j TY P 0 for every Y 2 C; where T is a
nonnegative multiple of a probability measureg
 fT j TY P 0 for every Y 2 Con‘ðCÞ; where T is a
nonnegative multiple of a probability measureg since
by Soundness if Y 2 Con‘ðCÞ then Y 2 ConðCÞ
 Con‘ðCÞþ \R:
Cþ  Con‘ðCÞþ by Theorem 3:5 as C  Con‘ðCÞ by definition; so Cþ \R
 Con‘ðCÞþ \R:
Hence, Cþ \R ¼ Con‘ðCÞþ \R.
(3) Con‘ðCÞ ¼ CðC [IÞ
Con‘ðCÞ  CðC [IÞ from the deﬁnitions, the observation that the members of I
are variable representations of theorems, and Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3.
Con‘ðCÞ  CðC [IÞ from the deﬁnitions, the observation that X ½dða;1Þ ¼ I ½a\d, the
fact that by Proposition 2.1 equivalent gambles are represented by the same variable,
and the observation that CONTINGENCY and UPDATING do not change the variable
representation of sentences as shown by the calculations used above in establishing
Soundness.
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ðCðC [IÞÞþ ¼ fT j TX P 0 for every X 2 CðC [IÞg.
For every x 2 X*, Ifxg 2 CðC [IÞ and so for every T 2 ðCðC [IÞÞþ, T(x)P 0
for every x 2 X*; i.e., for every T 2 ðCðC [IÞÞþ, T 2 R. Thus,
ðCðC [IÞÞþ \R ¼ ðCðC [IÞÞþ.
(5) Con(C) = (Con‘(C)
+)+
By applying (1), (2), (3), (4), and (3) in turn.
(6) Con(C) = Con‘(C)
By (3), Con‘(C) is a ﬁnite convex cone, and so by Theorem 3.4 Con‘(C) =
(Con‘(C)
+)+; hence, by (5)Con(C) = Con‘(C). hTo complete our demonstration of ﬁnite completeness, suppose C m S, where
C ¼ fhG1 j d1i; . . . ; hGk j dkig and S ¼ hG j di:
Then X ½dG 2 ConðCÞ, and so by Proposition 3.6 (6) X ½dG 2 Con‘ðCÞ; i.e., there is a sentence
hG 0 j d 0i such that C ‘ hG 0 j d 0i and X ½d0 G0 ¼ X
½d
G. By Lemma 3.1, hG 0 j d 0i ‘ hG j di. Conse-
quently, C ‘ hG j di; i.e., C ‘ S.
4. Behavioral semantics for L
In our behavioral semantics for L, which we study in this section, we replace the con-
cept of a probability distribution with a concept of lower prevision adapted from Walley
[15]. The context for this section is the syntax and inference procedure forL that we devel-
oped in Section 2. In particular, an underlying logic L0 is in place, and the sample space
X0 is deﬁned. We leave aside, however, the semantics developed in Section 3 to study a
diﬀerent semantics for the same syntax and inference procedure.
4.1. Lower previsions
Suppose X is a nonempty set and A is a ﬁeld of subsets of X. Write X for the linear
space consisting of all real-valued functions on X that are measurable with respect to A
and take only ﬁnitely many values. We call a real-valued function P on X a lower prevision
for X if it satisﬁes these three conditions:
(1) P(X)P inf{X(x) jx 2 X} for all X 2 X.
(2) P(X1 + X2)P P(X1) + P(X2) for all X 1;X 2 2 X.
(3) P(rX) = rP(X) for all rP 0 and X 2 X.
We call a lower prevision satisfying condition 2 with equality for all X 1;X 2 2 X a linear
prevision.
The following proposition gives some insight into the concepts of lower prevision and
linear prevision by relating them to more familiar concepts.
Proposition 4.1
(1) A real-valued function P on X is a linear prevision if and only if there is a finitely addi-
tive probability measure P on ðX;AÞ such that
P.R. Gillett et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 44 (2007) 281–300 295P ðX Þ ¼ EPX for all X 2 X:
(Here EP is the expected value operator for P.)
(2) A real-valued function P on X is a lower prevision if and only if it is the lower envelope
of the expected value operators for a set of finitely additive probability measures—i.e.,
if and only if there is a set K of finitely additive probability measures on ðX;AÞ such
that
P ðX Þ ¼ inf
P2K
EPX for all X 2 X:
Statement 1 is proven in Section 3.2 of Walley [15] and Statement 2 in Section 3.3.
Notice, however, that our terminology is not quite the same as Walley’s. He calls any
real-valued function on any set of bounded real-valued functions on X a lower prevision,
and he relates the three conditions that we have used as the deﬁnition of lower prevision to
a concept that he calls coherence. For an explanation of our disagreement with Walley
regarding coherence, see [13].
Our motivation for considering lower previsions does not derive from their relation to
probability measures. On the contrary, we regard lower previsions as more fundamental
than probability measures, because they emerge more directly from the idea of the accept-
ability of gambles. For the moment, let us follow Wilson and Moral by thinking of the
elements of X as gambles, and let us write C for the subset of X consisting of the gambles
we consider acceptable. What should C look like? According to the intuition that underlies
both our inference procedure forL and our deﬁnition of lower prevision, C should satisfy
three conditions (see also Walley [15]):
(1) If X 1; . . . ;Xn 2 C, and r1, . . . , rn are positive real numbers, then r1X 1 þ    þ
rnX n 2 C.
(2) If infx2XX(x)P 0, then X 2 C.
(3) 1 62 C.
But it is easy to verify that if C veriﬁes these conditions, and we set
P ðX Þ ¼ supfajX  a 2 Cg ð9Þ
for all X 2 X, then P qualiﬁes as a lower prevision, and
P ðX ÞP 0 if and only if X 2 C:
(Accepting X  a is the same as paying a for X, and so (9) is the most one will pay for X.
Thus P(X)P 0 if and only if one will pay 0 for X.)
Conversely, if we start with a lower prevision P, and set C :¼ fX j PðX ÞP 0g, then C
will satisfy our three conditions. So we could deﬁne our behavioral semantics directly in
terms of C rather than P. This would make behavioral semantics much more transparent.
Using lower previsions has the advantage, however, of emphasising the similarities with
measure–theoretic semantics.
4.2. Entailment under behavioral semantics
Here are the deﬁnitions of interpretation and satisfaction in our behavioral semantics
for L:
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• An interpretation P satisﬁes a sentence hG j di ifP ðX ½dG ÞP 0: ð10Þ
This is quite parallel to measure–theoretic semantics, where an interpretation, a probabil-
ity distribution P on X0, satisﬁes hG j di if EP ðX ½dG ÞP 0. Because the expected value oper-
ators for probability distributions are a special kind of lower prevision (namely, linear
previsions), we may say that behavioral semantics generalizes measure–theoretic seman-
tics. We write b for the entailment relation for logicL determined by this new deﬁnition
of satisfaction.
4.3. Soundness under behavioral semantics
The demonstration that L’s axioms and inference rules are sound with respect to
behavioral semantics proceeds just like the demonstration with respect to measure–theo-
retic semantics (Section 3.2).
4.4. Completeness under behavioral semantics
The completeness ofL under behavioral semantics follows easily from its completeness
under measure–theoretic semantics.
Suppose, indeed, that C b S, where
C ¼ fhG1 j d1i; . . . ; hGk j dkig and S ¼ hG j di:
This means that if P is a lower prevision and P ðX ½diGi ÞP 0 for i = 1, . . . ,k, then P ðX
½d
G ÞP 0.
Because a linear prevision is a lower prevision, this means in particular that if EPX
½di
Gi P 0
for i = 1, . . . ,k, then EPX
½d
G P 0. In other words, C m S, where m is the entailment rela-
tion under measure–theoretic semantics. So we obtain C ‘ S from completeness under
measure–theoretic semantics.
5. Expressibility and proof in L
A sentence inLN expresses a bound on the probability of a sentence in the underlying
logic, while a sentence in LFH expresses bounds on the conditional probability of such a
sentence (in this case, a sentence in propositional logic). Any bound on the probability or
conditional probability of a sentence can be expressed as the condition that a particular
gamble has a nonnegative expected value, and therefore both LN and LFH can be
regarded as fragments of our more expressive logic L. There is however, more to say,
especially in the case of LFH, which has formal inference rules. Just how do sentences
in LN or LFH translate into sentences in L, and how are LFH’s inference rules related
to L’s?
Nilsson, inLN, began with sentences of the form PðaÞ ¼ a and inferred sentences of the
more general forms a 6 PðaÞ and PðaÞ 6 b. In order to translate these sentences into L,
we can be guided by a fact about the common semantics: the probability of an event A
under an interpretation P is the same as the expected value under P of the indicator var-
iable IA. This produces the translations shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Translating from Nilsson’s logic LN to L
Sentence in LN Equivalent condition on P Sentence in L
a 6 PðaÞ EP(I[a]  a)P 0 h(a, 1)(>, a) j >i
PðaÞ 6 b EP(b  I[a])P 0 h(>,b)(a, 1) j >i
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an upper bound on a conditional probability
Pða j dÞ 2 ½a; b: ð11Þ
How should we translate this sentence into L? The most natural approach might be to
add the condition d to the translations of a 6 PðaÞ and PðaÞ 6 b in Table 2. This produces
two sentences
hða; 1Þð>;aÞ j di and hð>; bÞða;1Þ j di: ð12Þ
Another approach is to translate the sentence (11) directly into a condition on an interpre-
tation P
a 6 P ð½a \ ½dÞ
P ð½dÞ 6 b: ð13Þ
Under the convention that the ratio is zero when its denominator is zero, condition (13) is
equivalent to the two conditions
P ð½a \ ½dÞ  a  P ð½dÞP 0 and b  P ð½dÞ  P ð½a \ ½dÞP 0
and these two conditions are naturally expressed in L by the two sentences
hða ^ d; 1Þðd;aÞ j >i and hðd; bÞða ^ d;1Þ j >i: ð14Þ
Both (12) and (14) are correct; the sentences h(a, 1)(>, a) j di and h(a ^ d, 1)(d, a) j>i are
equivalent to each other, and the sentences h(>,b)(a, 1) j di and h(d,b)(a ^ d, 1) j>i are
equivalent to each other. Because the sentences (11) in LFH have the same interpretation
as the sentences (14) inL (both mean that the condition (13) holds under the convention
that the ratio is zero when the denominator is zero), this translation is in fact a translation
ofLFH into our probabilistic logic. So we may say that we have extended Frisch and Had-
dawy’s logic and added a sound and complete inference procedure. Together with the sound-
ness of their inference rules, this implies that their inference rules are consequences of ours.
There is one complication, deriving from the fact one of Frisch and Haddawy’s is rep-
resented by two of our sentences. Because of their representation, Frisch and Haddawy
introduce the following inference rule:Pða j dÞ 2 ½x; y
Pða j dÞ 2 ½u; v
Pða j dÞ 2 ½maxðx; uÞ;minðy; vÞThis rule can be seen as an embodiment of the anytime character of their logicLFH; if
we apply this rule whenever it can be applied, we always know the tightest bounds on the
probability of a given d that are justiﬁed by our computation so far. Because we express
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an implementation we could, of course, track the largest a for which h(a ^ d, 1)(d, a) j>i
is in our database and the smallest b for which h(d,b)(a ^ d, 1) j>i is in it.
Consider now, for example, the axioms for probability used in the logic of Fagin, Halp-
ern and Meggido [3]:
P1 l(X)P 0 for all X 2 X,
P2 l(S) = 1,
P300 lðX Þ ¼ lðX \ Y Þ þ lðX \ Y Þ.We may write P300 equivalently as: if Pða ^ bÞ ¼ a and Pða ^ bÞ ¼ b, then PðaÞ ¼ aþ b.
Then, translating each equality into two inequalities and applying (12), we obtain the fol-
lowing sequent:(1a) h(a ^ b, 1)(>, a) j>i
(1b) h(>,a)(a ^ b, 1) j>i
(2a) hða ^ b; 1Þð>;bÞ j >i
(2b) hð>; bÞða ^ b;1Þ j >i
(3a) h(a, 1)(>, (a + b)) j>i
(3b) h(>,a + b)(a, 1) j>iThe derivations of the conclusions are straight-forward. Here is a derivation of (3a) in
L:(i) h(a ^ b, 1)(>, a) j>i 1a
(ii) hða ^ b; 1Þð>;bÞ j >i 2a
(iii) hða ^ b; 1Þð>;aÞða ^ b; 1Þð>;bÞ j >i (i), (ii) COMBINATION
(iv) hða ^ b; 1Þða ^ b; 1Þð>;ðaþ bÞÞ j >i (iii) SUBSTITUTION type 6
(v) hðða ^ bÞ _ ða ^ bÞ; 1Þð>;ðaþ bÞÞ j >i (iv) SUBSTITUTION type 8
(vi) h(a, 1)(>, (a + b)) j >i (v) SUBSTITUTION type 9The derivation of (3b) in L follows similar lines:(i) h(>,a)(a ^ b, 1) | >i 1b
(ii) hð>; bÞða ^ b;1Þ j >i 2b
(iii) hð>; aÞða ^ b;1Þð>; bÞða ^ b;1Þ j >i (i), (ii) COMBINATION
(iv) hð>; aþ bÞða ^ b;1Þða ^ b;1Þ j >i (iii) SUBSTITUTION type 6
(v) hð>; aþ bÞðða ^ bÞ _ ða ^ bÞ;1Þ j >i (iv) SUBSTITUTION type 8
(vi) h(>,a + b)(a, 1) j>i (v) SUBSTITUTION type 9Although these proofs are trivial, it is of interest to note that they use only our Accept-
ability rules, and in a sense reveal why P300 is a consequence of our notion of acceptability
of gambles. Since our logic L is complete, we know that all Frisch and Haddawy’s infer-
ence rules can be derived in L. Nevertheless, it may provide some insight into the oper-
ation of our logic to show how they may be derived. For example, Frisch and
Haddawy’s Rule (vii) says:
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Pða j b ^ dÞ 2 ½u; v
Pða ^ b j dÞ 2 ½x  u; y  vIn L, this can be written as the sequent:(1a) h(b, 1)(>, x) j di
(1b) h(>,y)(b, 1) j di
(2a) h(a, 1)(>, u) jb ^ di
(2b) h(>,v)(a, 1) jb ^ d i
(3a) h(a ^ b, 1)(>, (x Æ u)) j di
(3b) h(>, (y Æ v))(a ^ b, 1) j diThe ﬁrst half of this sequent, (3a), may be derived in L as follows:(i) h(b, 1)(>, x) j di 1a
(ii) h(a, 1)(>, u) jb ^ di 2a
(iii) h(a ^ b ^ d, 1)(> ^ b ^ d, u) j di (ii) CONTINGENCY b ^ d)0 d
(iv) h(a ^ b, 1)(> ^ b, u) j di (iii) UPDATING d)0 d
(v) h(a ^ b, 1)(b, u) j di (iv) SUBSTITUTION type 9
(vi) h(b,u)(>, (x Æ u)) j di (i) SCALING uP 0
(vii) h(a ^ b, 1)(b, u)(b,u)(>, (x Æ u)) j di (v), (vi) COMBINATION
(viii) h(a ^ b, 1)(b, 0)(>, (x Æ u)) j di (vii) SUBSTITUTION type 6
(ix) h(a ^ b, 1)(>, (x Æ u)) j d i (viii) SUBSTITUTION type 2The structure of the derivation of the ﬁnal part of the sequent, (3b) follows the same
lines and in the interests of space is left as an exercise for the reader. In the derivations
shown here, each of our inference rules has played some part, though we have chosen
examples where the use of UPDATING is trivial (cf. line (iv) in the derivation above, where
we rely only on d)0 d); in this article we do not explore the signiﬁcance and power of this
particular form of UPDATING or the consequences of adopting weaker versions instead.
However, our axiom of RATIONALITY has not been needed. We leave it to the reader to con-
ﬁrm that it is required, for example, to prove Frisch and Haddawy’s Rule (v).
6. Summary and conclusions
Why stop with a language that is only hyperplane expressive? Why not further expand
the language so that it can say anything one pleases about the probabilities of sentences in
the underlying logic? There are two obvious ways to answer this question:
• If we are really only interested in the probabilities of individual sentences, as Nilsson
and Frisch and Haddawy appeared to be, then there is no reason to generalize further.
• We might feel that we want more than bounds on individual probabilities, but that
hyperplane expressiveness is enough. Most practical work with probabilities is directed
towards decision-making, and we might argue that decisions depend only on the accept-
ability of gambles.
300 P.R. Gillett et al. / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 44 (2007) 281–300We might also challenge the ontological role of probabilities. Is a probability something
with a reality of its own, or is it only a way of expressing our attitudes? If it is only a way of
expressing our attitudes, and if the attitudes in question come down to the willingness to
accept gambles, then we step outside what is meaningful when we go beyond hyperplane
expressiveness. This is the view taken by Walley.
Walley’s view throws into question, of course, the presumption that a probabilistic logic
should use probability measures as interpretations. If the reality to which we are referring
has only acceptable gambles, then perhaps these, not probabilities, should be our interpre-
tations. Perhaps also some of our inference rules should be reconsidered. In particular, the
conditioning rule UPDATING can be called into question, for it does not have a clear direct
justiﬁcation in terms of the acceptability of gambles.
Our work in this area is motivated by our interest in moving beyond standard proba-
bility measures as a semantics for probabilistic logic. In addition to relaxing inference rules
such as UPDATING to investigate alternative formulations for conditional probability, we
are also interested in shifting away from the static framework of a sample space. This
would move probabilistic logic in the direction of temporal and causal logic, and would
make contact with our earlier work on basing logic on the concept of an event space
[12]. See [13].
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